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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal from the First Circuit of Box 
Elder County, Brigham City Department, to the Court of Appeals is 
proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2A-3. 
ii . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. 
Did the opinion of the majority err in holding that the 
arresting officer did not exceed the purpose and scope of the 
detention in demanding to see the driver's license of Defendant, 
Steven Murphy. 
II. 
Did the opinion of the majority err in holding that there is 
no evidence in the record that the Defendants were detained 
against their will at the point in time when the arresting officer 
asked to see the driver's license of Defendant, Steven Murphy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts upon which the parties rely for this appeal are 
contained in a written narative by the arresting officer which was 
made part of the record in the trial court and a copy of which was 
included in the appendix of the original brief filed by Appellants 
in this matter. 
On October 3, 1986 the arresting officer received a radio 
call from another police officer. This second officer stated that 
he had seen the vehicle owned by Defendant, Darrell Murphy# and 
that he believed that Darrell was driving. The second officer 
also informed the arresting officer that Darrell's operator's 
license was suspended. The arresting officer went to the area 
where the vehicle had been seen; and observed the vehicle. The 
officer called the dispatcher and verified that in fact Darrell's 
license was suspended. The officer ther} states that as the 
i 
vehicle was making a turn in front of him, his headlights 
illuminated the interior of the vehicle and specifically the 
driver's face. At this point it appeared to him that the driver 
was in fact Darrell'Murphy. The officer then stopped the vehicle 
and approached the driver's side window. Upon seeing the driver, 
the officer realized that he was mistaken in his belief that the 
driver was Darrell. The driver of the vehicle was Defendant, 
Steven Murphy, Darrell's older brother. Darrell Murphy was in 
fact seated in the passenger side. The officer explained the 
reason for the stop, ie. his belief that Darrell was driving the 
car, to which Darrell responded, "I know I'm on suspension, that's 
why he is driving". The officer then asked Steven to produce his 
license, to which Steven replied that he did not have his license 
with him. The officer then proceeded back to his patrol car to 
check the status of Steven's license. The report came back that 
Steven was also on suspension. Upon returning to the Defendants' 
vehicle the officer stated that he noticed a smell of alcohol 
coming from Steven's breath; and later a similar odor from 
Darrell's breath. Based upon this suspicion, further 
investigation resulted in the arrest of both Defendants. 
Defendants thereafter moved to suppress all of the evidence 
against them; and this motion was denied. Defendants were 
convicted after a trial and thereafter appealed. The Court of 
Appeals in a two to one decision ruled that; 1) the demand of the 
officer to see the license of Steven Murphy was within the scope 
of the original stop; and 2) that there was no evidence in the 
record that at the time the officer demanded the license, the 
Defendants were detained against their will. Defendants now 
petition for a rehearing. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The opinion of the majority, holding that the purpose for the 
initial investigative stop of the Defendants' vehicle was to 
determine if the operator had a valid license, is overly broad and 
not supported by the facts. The reason that the officer stopped 
the vehicle was to first determine if Defendant, Darrell Murphy, 
was the driver; and second, if in fact Darrell was the driver, did 
he have a valid license. In addition, the officer's demand that 
Defendant, Steven Murphy, produce his driver's license was clearly 
not within the scope of the purpose of the initial stop in as much 
as there were no specific facts known to the officer upon which he 
could have formed a reasonable suspicion that Steven was engaged 
in any illegal activity. 
The opinion of the majority that there is no evidence that 
the Defendants were detained against their will after the initial 
stop is unreasonable under the facts; and is a misapplication of 
the law as set forth in State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, (Utah, 
1987). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The majority opinion erred in holding that the police 
officer's demand that Defendant, Steven Murphy, produce his 
driver's license was within the scope of the initial stop. 
The majority in its opinion, dated March 18, 1988, states: 
"The purpose of the stop was not fulfilled when 
Steven was found to be the driver. The purpose of the 
stop was not fulfilled when Steven was asked but failed 
to produce his operator's license. The purpose was 
fulfilled only when the officer contacted the dispatcher 
and discovered the status of the operator's license. The 
officer was at all time acting within the proper scope of 
the stop..." 
This conclusion is not consistent with the facts. The 
officer states in his narrative that he received a radio report 
from another officer that the vehicle of Defendant, Darrell 
Murphy, had been seen and that Darrell was possibly driving while 
his license was suspended. Once the officer located the vehicle, 
he checked with dispatch and was informed that Darrell's license 
was in fact suspended. The officer stated that as the vehicle 
turned in front of his car and the lights from his car illuminated 
the inside of Defendants' vehicle, he thought the person driving 
was Darrell. There really can be no doubt that the reason the 
officer stopped the vehicle was to find out whether or not Darrell 
was in fact driving; and if so, was his license suspended. The 
opinion of the majority would seem to suggest that the purpose of 
the stop was to determine if the operator of the vehicle, whoever 
it might have been, had a valid license. This simply is not the 
case,. The officer was not investigating just any operator; but 
rather was investigating a specific operator, Darrell Murphy. The 
information that officer had available was not about just any 
operator; but about a particular operator, Darrell Murphy. The 
opinion of the majority would seem to ignore the specific facts of 
this case. For example, had the officer not have been acquainted 
with either Defendant; and simply stopped the vehicle based upon 
the report that the driver was possibly on suspension, then the 
officer would have needed to ask to see the license of the person 
who was driving simply to determine if he was in fact the person 
whose license was possibly suspended. Or if the officer had not 
been able to distinguish between the two brothers, then it would 
have been appropriate to ask for the license of the driver to 
determine if he was in fact the one possibly on suspension. 
However the fact is that the officer was acquainted with both 
brothers and knew immediately that the driver was not Darrell. 
The opinion of the majority with respect! to the purpose of the 
detention would seem to be overly broad; and would seem to ignore 
the specific facts that the officer had available to him. 
If in fact the arresting officer was at all times acting 
within the scope and purpose of the initial detention, as the 
opinion of the majority states, then his actions should be able to 
meet the scrutiny of the reasonable suspicion standard. That is 
to say that the officer should be able to articulate specific 
facts that led him to reasonably believe that Defendant, Steven 
Murphy, had or was about to commit a crime. If the totality of 
the circumstances do not justify any such reasonable suspicion, 
then the action of the officer in demanc(ing that Steven produce 
his license would have to be outside the scope and purpose of the 
stop. Again, an examination of the facts clearly shows that the 
officer had no suspicion with respect to Steven at all. It is 
undisputed that all of the information which the officer had was 
related to Darrell. It was Darrell whom was suspected of driving 
the vehicle. It was Darrell*s license which the officer calLed 
dispatch to check. It was Darrell that the officer thought he saw 
when his headlights illuminated the inside of the vehicle. There 
was absolutely no reason for the officer to suspect that Steven 
had been engaged or was about to egage in any illegal activity. 
As noted above, it would seem that the opinion of the majority has 
overlooked the fact that the officer was acquainted with both 
Defendants and that the officer knew immediately upon approaching 
the vehicle that the driver was not Darrell, but rather Steven. 
But since the officer did know both Defendants and did recognize 
the driver as Steven, this information must be taken into 
consideration when determining the whether or not there was a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver, Steven, was engaged in any 
illegal activity. The majority in its opinion quoting from State 
v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah, 1987) and United States v. 
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984) states: 
"...an officer may seize a person if the officer 
has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; however, the detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop".. . (emphasis added) . 
It would seem clear that the majority opinion erred in holding 
that the officer was at all times acting within the proper scope 
of the stop; and that the detention of Defendants lasted no longer 
than was necessary for the officer to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop. It would also seem clear that based upon the specific 
facts of the case, there was no articulable suspicion that Steven 
Murphy had or was about to engage in illegal conduct; and 
consequently that the Defendants were unreasonable "seized". 
POINT II. 
The opinion of the majority erred in holding that there is no 
evidence that the Defendants were detained against their will at 
the point in time that the officer requested to see the license of 
Defendant, Steven Murphy. 
The opinion of the majority states 
"The officer, therefore, is properly standing 
beside vehicle. Absent any suspicion, Deitman permits 
the officer to ask questions of the driver so long as 
the driver is not detained against his will. An 
examination of the narrative fails to show any 
indication of detention." 
The opinion of the majority is based upon the holding in State v. 
Deitman, supra, where the Utah Supreme Court, quoting from, United 
States v. Merritt, supra, states: 
"...an officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will;..." 
The opinion of the majority, however, would seem to be overlooking 
the facts of this case; and would seem to be misapplying the rule 
°f Deitman and Merritt. The majority does acknowledge that the 
Defendants were initially stopped against their will when the 
officer pulled them over. The opinion of the majority would also 
seem to accept that the Defendants were detained against their 
will while the officer was walking up to their car. However, 
somehow when the officer reaches the car and learns that the 
driver is not Darrell, but rather Steven, the Defendants are no 
longer being detained. 
This court, in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) 
quoting from United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 
1870 (1980) stated: 
"When a reasonable person, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of 
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but 
because he believes he is not free to leave a seizure 
occurs." 
In United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 
1986) the court stated: 
"There are three tiers of police-citizen encounters 
with respect to Fourth Amendment; police-citizen 
communications involving no coercion or detention, which 
do not implicate Fourth Amendment scrutiny, brief 
seizures involving reasonably brief encounters in which 
reasonable person would have believed that he or she 
was not free to leave, which require showing by 
government of reasonable articulable suspicion that 
person has committed or is about commit crime, and full 
scale arrests, which are more intrusive encounters 
requiring probable cause." (emphasis added). 
The court should have applied this "reasonable person" test to 
determine if the Defendants were detained against their will. It 
would appear that the majority did not. The facts are that the 
arresting officer stopped the Defendants vehicle at approximately 
11:25 pm., presumably through some audio and/or visual signal. 
There is no question that this was against the will of Defendants. 
The officer next proceeded to the driver's side where he realized 
that the driver was Steven and that Darrell was seated in the 
passenger side. The officer next explained to Defendants the 
reason for the stop; and then requested that Steven produce a 
d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . Iftien S t e v e n c o u l d n o t , t h e o f f i c e r r e q u e s t e d 
the necessary information from Steven with which to call dispatch 
to check the license. Applying the "reasonable person" test then# 
would a reasonable person in the position of Defendants, believe 
that he or she was at any point free to leave. The majority 
opinion would seem to indicate that the detention ended somewhere 
between the officer recognizing Steven as the driver and Darrell 
as the passenger, and the officer asking Steven for his license. 
Would a reasonable person have believed that he or she was free to 
leave at this point in time? Should the Defendants have 
reasonably believed that they were free to simply roll up the 
window and drive away unhindered? And if so, what specific fact 
could a reasonable person point to as the indication that he or 
she was no longer required to remain? What indication did the 
officer give that the Defendants were free to leave? Obviously, 
a reasonable person would not have believed that he or she was 
free to leave. The officer gave no indication, spoken or 
otherwise, that the detention he had just effected, under the 
color of his authority as a peace officer, was at an end. A 
reasonable person would have believed th^t he or she was required 
to do exactly what the Defendants did, remain and respond. 
The majority also seems to be misapplying the standard of 
Deitman, supra. Deitman, involved a situation where the officer 
asked the suspects if they would mind speaking with him. The 
suspects voluntarily crossed the street to meet the officer and 
produced identification when requested. There had been no prior 
detention of the suspects as was the case with Defendants. 
Defendants do no claim that what is initially a detention against 
will cannot evolve into something less; but there would seem to 
have to be some point in time where a reasonable person would 
believe that he or she was free to go and voluntarily choose to 
remain• This is clearly not the case with Defendants. The 
Defendants could not have reasonably believed that they were free 
to leave after the officer had stopped their vehicle and 
approached on the driver's side; and consequently they were in 
fact still being detained against their will. 
CONCLUSION 
The opinion of the majority erred in holding that the 
arresting officer was at all times acting within the scope of the 
stop. l/hen the officer requested that Steven produce his license 
he went beyond the scope of the stop, in as much as he had no 
articulable suspicion that Steven had been engaged in any illegal 
activity. The detention of Defendants lasted longer than was 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop and the "seizure" 
was therefore unreasonable. 
The opinion of the majority also erred in holding that there 
is no evidence that the Defendants were detained against their 
will at the time that the officer requested that Steven produce 
his license. A reasonable person would not have believed that he 
or she was free to leave; and therefore the Defendants were 
detained against their will. 
Defendants respectfully request that the court reverse the 
decision of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to 
suppress; or in the alternative, that the court grant further 
rehearing of this case. 
DATED this / *&T day of May, 1988. 
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